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Abstract
The research literature on cybersecurity incident detection & response is very rich in automatic detection methodologies, in par-
ticular those based on the anomaly detection paradigm. However, very little attention has been devoted to the diagnosis ability of
the methods, aimed to provide useful information on the causes of a given detected anomaly. This information is of utmost impor-
tance for the security team to reduce the time from detection to response. In this paper, we present Multivariate Big Data Analysis
(MBDA), a complete intrusion detection approach based on 5 steps to effectively handle massive amounts of disparate data sources.
The approach has been designed to deal with the main characteristics of Big Data, that is, the high volume, velocity and variety.
The core of the approach is the Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring (MSNM) technique proposed in a recent paper. Unlike
in state of the art machine learning methodologies applied to the intrusion detection problem, when an anomaly is identified in
MBDA the output of the system includes the detail of the logs of raw information associated to this anomaly, so that the security
team can use this information to elucidate its root causes. MBDA is based in two open software packages available in Github: the
MEDA Toolbox and the FCParser. We illustrate our approach with two case studies. The first one demonstrates the application of
MBDA to semistructured sources of information, using the data from the VAST 2012 mini challenge 2. This complete case study
is supplied in a virtual machine available for download. In the second case study we show the Big Data capabilities of the approach
in data collected from a real network with labeled attacks.
Keywords:
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1. Introduction
Intrusion Detection has become a priority for many organi-
zations, as a result of data becoming a fundamental asset for
creating value on modern services. According to the VERI-
ZON annual Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR) [1], in
2017 several tens of thousands of attacks targeted private and
public corporations. The 94% of these attacks had an economic
motivation, including industrial espionage. They show a profile
of high sophistication, with organized teams of high technical
specialization that are sometimes referred to as Advanced Per-
sistent Threats (APTs). An alarming factor of the DBIR report
is the ratio between mean time of compromise and mean time of
detection. While the former is in the order of minutes, the latter
is in the order of weeks or even months. This means the attacker
has plenty of time for privilege escalation and any other neces-
sary malicious activity to access and ex-filtrate protected data.
On average, stolen personal registers are in the tens of millions
per attack, with a tremendous impact on the corporate image.
To mention some notorious examples, the data breach of 412M
personal files including email accounts associated to the adult
dating service Friend Finder Network and Penthouse.com and
∗Corresponding author: J. Camacho (email: josecamacho@ugr.es)
the data breach of more than a billion personal accounts from
the email operator River City Media, used in a massive SPAM
campaign [2].
This situation has boosted the market of intrusion detection,
in particular of the so-called Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) systems [3]. A SIEM is aimed at aggre-
gating and analyzing data coming from diverse sensor devices
deployed through the network, with the ultimate goal of detect-
ing, triaging and validating security incidents. In a recent report
[4], Gartner estimates in 90 billion dollars the cost associated to
cybersecurity incidents in 2017, which implies an increment of
7.6% with respect to the preceding year. The report foresees
a change of tendency in cybersec, with a growing effort in de-
tection and response in comparison to prevention means. Fol-
lowing this tendency, the corporations are devoting more eco-
nomic and human resources to incident detection, creating the
so-called Cyber Incident Response Teams (CIRTs). A CIRT de-
votes a large proportion of its resources to analyze potential in-
cidents. A main limitation for that is the shortage of specialized
professionals. Combining this shortage with the proliferation
of information leakage attacks, there is a clear need of efficient
tools and mechanisms to aid in the detection, triaging and anal-
ysis of incidents, in order to make CIRTs more effective in the
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arms race against APTs.
Multivariate Analysis has been recognized as an outstanding
approach for anomaly detection in several domains, including
industrial monitoring [5] and networking [6]. In the field of
industrial processing, in particular in the chemical and biotech-
nological industries, the state-of-the-art multivariate approach
for anomaly detection is named Multivariate Statistical Process
Control (MSPC), and has been developed for more than three
decades. In a previous work [7], we introduced a methodology
named Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring (MSNM),
which is an extension of MSPC to the cybersecurity domain.
We also extended the multivariate methodology to combine
traffic data with sources of security data, like IDS or firewall
logs, so as to efficiently integrate disparate sources in the inci-
dent detection.
This paper presents the Multivariate Big Data Analysis
(MBDA), a complete intrusion detection and analysis approach
based on 5 steps to effectively handle tons of disparate data
sources in cybersecurity. The core of the approach is the
MSNM technique. MBDA is a Big Data extension of MSNM
in which, when an anomaly is identified, the output includes the
logs of raw information associated with it. These, in turn, can
be presented to the CIRT, so as to elucidate the root causes for
the anomaly. This diagnosis ability of MBDA is a main advan-
tage over other machine learning methodologies.
MBDA is based in two open software pack-
ages available in Github: the MEDA Toolbox [8]
(https://github.com/josecamachop/MEDA-Toolbox) and
the FCParser (https://github.com/josecamachop/FCParser), the
latter presented in this paper for the first time. The FCParser is
a python tool for the parsing of both structured and unstructured
logs. With the MEDA Toolbox, multivariate modeling and data
visualization of the Big Data stream are possible. Combining
these two software packages in the 5 steps of MBDA, we show
that we are capable of accurately identifying the original raw
information related to a detected anomaly in the Big Data. That
is, we find the needle in the haystack. This makes MBDA a
perfect tool to dive into the overwhelming volumes of disparate
sources of information in the cybersecurity context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a brief revision of principal works on PCA-based anomaly
detection in networking and extensions to Big Data. Section 3
presents the fundamentals of the approach of this paper. Sec-
tions 4 and 5 illustrate the MBDA approach in two case studies:
the VAST 2012 mini challenge 2 and data collected from a real
network with labeled attacks. Section 6 summarizes the main
conclusions of the work.
2. Related Work
Among several other anomaly detection paradigms, statisti-
cal solutions have been widely adopted in the literature [9]. In
particular, the use of multivariate approaches such as PCA were
proposed more than a decade ago [10]. One of the main advan-
tages of PCA, similar to other one-class classifiers like OCSVM
[11], is its unsupervised nature, which does not require –and is
not limited by– an a-priori specification of potential anomalies
in the system. This means that PCA is useful to detect both
known and new types of anomalies, something mandatory in
real world network anomaly detection.
The most referred work for PCA anomaly detection is that of
Lakhina et al. [12]. However, a number of flaws are pointed
out for this approach [13], mainly as a result of its differences
with the more developed MSPC theory [7]. Several modifica-
tions of the original approach have been proposed with the aim
of solving some of those issues, e.g. [14–16]. More recent
research on multivariate analysis for security-related anomaly
detection has opted for combining PCA with other detection
schemes. Thus, Aiello et al. [17] combine PCA with mutual
information for profiling DNS tunneling attacks. Fernandes et
al. [6] combine PCA with a modified version of dynamic time
warping for network anomaly detection. They also propose an
alternative approach based on ant colony optimization. Jiang
et al. [18] apply PCA over a wavelet transform of the network
traffic for network-wide anomaly detection. Chen et al. [19]
use a similar approach with multi-scale PCA. Xia et al. pro-
pose an algorithm based in the Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) which is combined with other techniques for anomaly
detection by considering the cyclostationarity of the data [20].
Despite such a big effort in the field, most of the propos-
als still share part of the problems reported related to [12].
This motivated us to develop the MSNM methodology, which
was introduced in 2015 to solve these open problems [7]. The
MSNM methodology allows to combine traffic data with other
security data sources [21], demonstrating detection capabilities
comparable to state-of-the-art machine learning methodologies
with the additional advantage of providing diagnosis support
[22].
On the other hand, the huge amount of machine-generated
data in the network has fostered the application of Big Data
techniques for network anomaly detection [23]. A general trend
is to apply traditional anomaly detection on top of Big Data
tools like Hadoop [24][25], Apache Spark [26][27] or tools de-
rived from them [28]. Most works are based on clustering and
classification techniques [29][30][31][32][33][34] or use host
mining [35][31][36] to distinguish between normal and anoma-
lous patterns. A combination of clustering with k-means and
host mining is proposed in [37]. The k-means algorithm is also
used in other approaches, such as [38][39]. Entropy calcula-
tion to identify disturbances in the data is used in [40][41][42].
Finally, PCA is used in [35] for host mining together with clas-
sification trees.
Most of previous solutions are suited to handle the high volume
in Big Data. However, other well-known Big Data problems are
the velocity, the veracity and the variety, that is, the high incom-
ing pace of data, the level of trust in data and the requirement
to combine disparate data sources, respectively. The veloc-
ity is a relevant problem because most of the approaches need
to re-build the models on-line from new incoming data. This
problem is dealt in [43] by proposing an Iterative-Tunning Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM), which makes the training of the
model faster than the regular SVM. Velocity, volume and vari-
ety are addressed in [34], where machine learning techniques
are applied over a single variable to obtain signatures of known
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anomalies. The velocity and volume are handled by cloud com-
puting over an Apache Spark cluster. The entropy of flows in
network traffic is measured for anomaly detection in [41]. A
Least-Mean-Square adaptive filter is applied to obtain the cor-
relation between the entropies and make better predictions. The
velocity and volume are dealt with using an Apache Storm clus-
ter. The veracity is faced up in [44], proposing an entropy-based
anomaly detection system to identify attacks over the veracity
of the system, such as data injection attacks.
MBDA builds on previous works on MSNM and extends
the latter for its application to Big Data. On the one hand,
the Big Data functionality in the MEDA Toolbox [8, 45] is
employed to issue analytics on the Big Data stream used to
calibrate the anomaly detection model. This makes it pos-
sible to detect and isolate outliers that may affect the model
performance. On the other hand, a new tool named the FC-
Parser (https://github.com/josecamachop/FCParser) has been
developed to work in perfect association with MSNM. This tool
transforms raw data into analysis features and the other way
round, so that we can extend the MSNM diagnosis to the orig-
inal Big Data stream. This way, security professionals can use
MBDA without any knowledge of multivariate analysis, some-
thing which was not possible with MSNM. This enhancement
is expected to be very effective in reducing the time from detec-
tion to response in the face of cybersecurity incidents.
3. Multivariate Big Data Analysis: the 5 Steps
The MBDA approach consists of 5 steps:
1) Parsing: the raw data coming from structured and unstruc-
tured sources are transformed into quantitative features.
2) Fusion: the features of the different sources of data are
combined into a single data stream.
3) Detection: anomalies are identified in time.
4) Pre-diagnosis: the features associated with an anomaly are
found.
5) De-parsing: Using both detection and pre-diagnosis infor-
mation, the original raw data records related to the anoma-
lies are identified and presented to the analyst.
Notice the first three steps are equivalent to what it is com-
monly done in other machine learning methodologies. How-
ever, steps 4 and 5, which perform the diagnosis of the anoma-
lies, are a main advantage of the present proposal. These steps
are possible thanks to the white-box, exploratory characteris-
tics of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as the core of the
MSNM approach. PCA is a linear model and as such it is easy
to interpret in terms of the connection between anomalies and
features, something much more complicated or not even pos-
sible in the non-linear machine learning variants, like for in-
stance deep learning. The five steps, discussed in detail in what
follows, are illustrated in Figure 1 and summarized in Table 1.
Note all these steps can be fully automatized.
3.1. Parsing
The information captured from a network is usually pre-
sented in the form of system logs or network traces, and cannot
be directly used to feed a typical tool for anomaly detection.
Therefore, some sort of feature engineering and parsing needs
to be done in order to generate quantitative features that can be
used for data modeling.
In the context of anomaly detection with PCA, Lakhina et
al. [12] proposed the use of counters obtained from Netflow
records. In [21], we generalized this definition to consider
several sources of data, proposing the feature-as-a-counter ap-
proach: essentially the combination of data counts with multi-
variate analysis. Each feature contains the number of times a
given event takes place during a given time window. Examples
of suitable features are the count of a given word in a log or
the number of traffic flows with given destination port in a Net-
flow file. This general definition makes it possible to integrate,
in a suitable way, most sources of information into a model
for anomaly detection. This parsing approach is also used for
anomaly detection in X-pack [46], the proprietary counterpart
of the Elastic Stack, widely used for the analysis of Big Data
streams.
The parsing step is performed with the FCParser. For each
feature we are interested on, a corresponding regular expression
is defined in a configuration file. To obtain the specific values
of the features in a given sampling interval, the corresponding
regular expressions are run against the raw data of that interval,
and the parser records the number of matches. The selection
of the specific features included in the parsing step is a manual
process guided by expert knowledge of the data domain. Al-
though it is desirable to have an automatic feature extraction
process able to identify the relevant features to be considered
in the parsing step, this is still open to future research. In the
specific case study examples described in Sections 4 and 5 of
this paper we describe how we have applied a manual selection
of features.
Among the five steps, the parsing step performs the most ef-
fective compression of the data, reason why it is instrumental
for the application of MBDA to Big Data. Thus, the suitabil-
ity of the MBDA approach for intrusion detection is grounded
on the idea that we are capable of identifying security-related
anomalies in the resulting parsed (compressed) information and
of recovering the raw data related to such anomalies.
3.2. Fusion
In the previous step, a set of features is defined for each dif-
ferent source of data. The sampling rate to derive the counts
for each source may be chosen to be different, due to dif-
ferent dynamics of the sources or for convenience. Thus, to
combine the features from different sources, these need to be
stretched/compressed to a common sampling rate. Then, the
features of the different sources are simply appended, yielding
a unique stream of featured data of high dimensionality. The
Fusion step is also done in the FCParser.
The combination of the feature-as-a-counter and the fusion
procedure is specially suited for the subsequent multivariate
3
Figure 1: Illustration of the 5 steps of the proposed approach.
Table 1: Summary of the five steps in MBDA.
STEP INPUT OUTPUT SOFTWARE
1. Parsing Raw data stream Stream of features per source FCParser
2. Fusion Stream of features per source Single feature stream FCParser
3. Detection Single feature stream Timestamps for anomalies MEDA Toolbox
4. Pre-diagnosis Single feature stream & Timestamps for anomalies Features for anomalies MEDA Toolbox
5. De-parsing Raw data stream & Timestamps & Features for anomalies Raw logs for anomalies FCParser
analysis. It yields high dimensional feature vectors that need
to be analysed with dimension reduction techniques, like PCA.
Furthermore, counts and their correlation are easy to interpret.
We will show that the diagnosis procedure in the 4th step, and
the consequent 5th step, are benefited from the definition of a
large number of features so as to better describe the anomaly
taking place. This is the opposite in most anomaly detec-
tion schemes, where large dimensionality is seen as a concern,
sometimes even referred to as a curse.
3.3. Detection
The core of MSNM is PCA. PCA is applied to data sets
where M variables or features are measured for N observations.
The aim of PCA is to find the subspace of maximum variance in
the M-dimensional feature space. The original features are lin-
early transformed into the Principal Components (PCs). These
are the eigenvectors ofXT ·X, typically for mean centeredX and
sometimes also after auto-scaling, that is, normalizing variables
to unit variance.
PCA follows the expression:
X = TA · PtA + EA, (1)
where A is the number of PCs, TA is the N × A score matrix,
PA is the M × A loading matrix and EA is the N × M matrix of
residuals. The columns in PA are typically normalized to unit
length vectors, so that the PCA transformation actually splits
the variance in X into a structural part represented by the scores
TA and a residual part represented by EA.
For the detection of anomalies in MSNM, a pair of statis-
tics are defined: the D-statistic (D-st) or Hotelling’s T2 statis-
tic, computed from the scores, and the Q-statistic (Q-st), which
compresses the residuals. Thus, using PCA and these statistics,
we transform the problem of monitoring a highly dimensional
multivariate stream of data X into the much simpler problem of
monitoring a pair of statistics.
After a new sampling time interval, a new observation of the
features xn is computed. Subsequently, the corresponding score
vector is calculated as follows:
tn = xn · PA (2)
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where tn is a 1 × A vector with the corresponding scores, while
en = xn − tn · PtA (3)
corresponds to the residuals. The D-st and the Q-st for obser-
vation n can be computed from the following equations:
Dn = tn · (ΣT )−1 · ttn (4)
Qn = en · etn (5)
where ΣT represents the covariance matrix of the scores in the
calibration data. The values of Dn and Qn are contrasted to the
statistics of the calibration data to identify anomalies.
A large percentage of the working effort of a CIRT is to an-
alyze data related to potential incidents. If an efficient triaging
method is available, more incidents can be detected by the same
amount of personnel. As a result, in the practical application of
MSNM to intrusion detection, we are more interested on the
anomalies triaging rather than on the dichotomous distinction
between what should be identified as anomaly and what should
not. To combine the D-st and the Q-st into a single triaging
score, we define here the Tscore of observation n according to
the following equation:
Tn = α · Dn/UCLD.99 + (1 − α) · Qn/UCLQ.99 (6)
where UCLD.99 and UCL
Q
.99 are the upper control limits for the
D-st and Q-st of the calibration data [7], respectively, computed
as 99% percentiles, and α is weighting factor for the combina-
tion, which value is discussed afterwards.
MSNM, following prior theory in the industrial field [5],
establishes two phases or modes of application. In the ex-
ploratory mode [12] or Phase I, PCA is applied to a data block
in order to find anomalies in that block. In the learning mode
[7] or Phase II, PCA is calibrated from a data block to build
a normality model, and then applied to new, incoming data, to
find the anomalous events. Phase I is devoted to network opti-
mization, troubleshooting and situation awareness: essentially
to detect, understand and solve any security-related problem
and misconfiguration that was already affecting the network
when the MSNM system was first deployed. These problems
are the so-called special causes of variability in the argot of
MSPC, because they induce unwanted variability in the data
collected from the system under monitoring. Phase I is car-
ried out by detecting and diagnosing outliers in the data. The
diagnosis is necessary to identify when there is a problem that
needs to be solved by the technical personnel. For instance, if
we identify an excess of blocked traffic in a gateway firewall,
this can be the result of a cyber-attack attempt that was cor-
rectly blocked by perimeter security measures, and therefore
no further action needs to be applied. Alternatively, this can be
the result of the firewall misconfiguration, which needs to be
fixed. Following an iterative procedure in Phase I, outliers are
isolated and diagnosed, and corresponding problems identified
and solved. When only non-relevant outliers remain, so that
the network can be considered under normal operation condi-
tions (NOC) or statistical control, we proceed to Phase II. In
Phase II, the anomaly detector is used to identify anomalies in
incoming data, typically in real time. The main idea beneath
the definition of these two phases is that an anomaly detector
should be developed only for a system under statistical control.
Both phases in MSNM will be illustrated in the case studies of
this paper.
Sometimes it is difficult to determine what should be under-
stood as an outlier and what not, and therefore when to stop
Phase I. The practical approach we suggest to follow is to look
for outliers in a bi-plot of the monitoring statistics or a barplot
of the Tscore. In those plots, outliers are easily identifiable. If
no outlier is found, we start Phase II. If otherwise any of the
detected outliers reflects a real configuration/security problem,
this needs to be solved and Phase I re-started by measuring new
traffic from the network. If no outlier identifies a practical prob-
lem, we still need to check whether the outliers pollute the PCA
model or not. For that purpose, we can compare the amount of
variance captured by each PC in the model with and without
outliers. If this does not vary to a large extent, then we can
proceed with Phase II. Otherwise, we discard the outliers and
re-start Phase I using the remaining data.
It should be noted that the computation of the Tscore, in par-
ticular the weighting parameter in eq. (6), differs in the two
phases. In Phase I, the data we inspect for outliers is also the
one used for model calibration. Therefore, outliers are inti-
mately connected to the model variance, that is, outliers are
expected to lay in the directions of high variance of the model.
In this situation, we can set α to the percentage of variance cap-
tured by the model. Thus, we put more weight on the part that
captures more variance, which depending on the case can be the
model or the residual part. In Phase II, however, this is not an
adequate way of setting α, since outliers are not part of the data
used to fit the model and therefore they may separate from the
rest of data in any potential direction of the space. Following
[22], in Phase II we use α equal to the ratio between the number
of PCs A and the number of variables M.
The multivariate analysis in this paper is performed using the
MEDA toolbox [8], which provides of a set of tools for multi-
variate anomaly detection. When data grows beyond a certain
volume, the Big Data extension of the toolbox can be used. The
basic principle of this extension is that multivariate models like
PCA can be computed iteratively, in a way that is scalable to
any data size and fully parallelizable. The loading vectors of
PCA can be identified using the eigendecomposition (ED) of
the cross-product matrix XT ·X, of dimension M×M. This ma-
trix can be computed in an iterative, incremental way as data is
inputting the system, so that the number of rows in X, N, is not
a limitation any more [21]. To visualize the statistics of large
numbers of observations, we use a clustering version of multi-
variate plots [45]. The Big Data module of the MEDA Toolbox
includes two computational cores: the iterative core and the ex-
ponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) core. Both al-
gorithms solve the out-of-core computation of models and the
corresponding clustering. The iterative core is used in this pa-
per to compute the models.
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3.4. Pre-Diagnosis
Once an anomaly is signaled, a pre-diagnosis step is per-
formed to identify the features associated with it. This informa-
tion is very useful to make a first guess on the root causes of the
anomaly. The contribution of the features to a given anomaly
can be investigated with the contribution plots or similar tools.
Among them, the most straightforward but effective approach
is named Univariate-Squared (US) [47], and follows:
d2 = (xn)T · |xn| (7)
Thus, anomalies are detected in the D-st and/or Q-st charts, and
then the pre-diagnosis is performed with the US. The output of
US is a 1×M vector where each element contains the contribu-
tion of the corresponding feature to the anomaly under study.
Those contributions with large magnitude, either positive or
negative, are determined to be relevant. The computation of
US for normal size data and Big Data is included in the MEDA
toolbox.
3.5. De-Parsing
The last step of the MBDA approach is the extraction of the
specific logs in the raw information that are associated with the
anomaly. To accomplish that, we use both the information from
the detection and the pre-diagnosis modules. The former pro-
vides the timestamps for the anomaly, which can be one or a set
of consecutive sampling intervals. The latter provides the main
features associated with the anomaly using eq. (7). The de-
parsing consist in reverting the parsing procedure selectively,
obtaining, as a result, the raw logs related to the anomalies. To
this end, the raw logs in the selected timestamps are matched
against the pre-diagnosis features and sorted by the number of
features they match. Depending on the data-set and the anoma-
lies detected, the amount of information extracted in the de-
parsing step could still be too large for visual inspection. For
this reason, a user-defined threshold is set to limit the amount
of retrieved data.
The FCParser is employed again in this step with the same
configuration files used in the parsing step, where the regular
expressions associated with the features were defined. In Al-
gorithm 1, the procedure of the de-parsing is detailed. Firstly,
the algorithm goes through all the input files corresponding to
the different data sources, looking for data records that occurred
in the given timestamps T and obtaining a selection of logs L.
Then, the algorithm goes through all log lines in L and assigns
a score called fscore. The fscore for a log line is the num-
ber of pre-diagnosis features (F) that appears in that line. This
metric enables the algorithm to sort the log lines by relevance
in an efficient way. Then, in a second loop, the extraction is
performed. On each iteration, the algorithm extracts all the log
lines that have fscore equal to N, where N is initialized to the
number of features in F. In this manner, the log lines that con-
tain all features F are extracted first. If the number of log lines
is not above the threshold, the number of features N is reduced
by one and the process is repeated. This is done for each data
source until we reach the threshold or N reaches 0.
The motivation for the de-parsing algorithm is that features
identified in the pre-diagnosis step will likely be correlated, but
do not necessary need to be present in all raw logs correspond-
ing to an attack. Sometimes the attack is described by several
types of logs that appear in the same time period. These logs
will not contain all the features identified in the de-parsing, but
a subset of them.
Algorithm 1: De-Parsing algorithm
Input: detection, pre-diagnosis
Output: R
1 T ← timestamps // Timestamps from detection
2 L ← select(T) // Logs from timestamps
3 F ← pre-diagnosis // Anomalous features
4 R ← []
5 N ← #F // Number of features to match
6 foreach logline in L do
7 fscore[logline] =n feat(logline,F)
// # of anomalous features in the
// logline
8 while len(R) < threshold do
9 R+ = extract(L,N, fscore)
// Extract lines with fscore=N
10 N ← N − 1
11 return R
3.6. Comparison of MBDA 5-steps with State-of-the-Art
Methodologies
In this section, we compare the main state-of-the-art anomaly
detection methodologies discussed in Section 2 with our pro-
posal, taking the 5-steps as a comparison framework. Ta-
ble 2 relates the aforementioned contributions to the 5 steps.
A checkmark is shown for those approaches that consider the
corresponding step. If the checkmark is into parenthesis, only
partial functionality of such step is implemented.
Methodologies based on traditional machine learning [11,
36, 43] typically perform steps 1 to 3, not dealing with pre-
diagnosis (step 4) or de-parsing (step 5). The same applies for
machine learning techniques focused in Big Data anomaly de-
tection [30–35, 37, 38]. Furthermore, some of the approaches
that combine traditional methodologies with Big Data tools
[40, 44], or multivariate techniques like [9, 10] only mention
step 1 (feature engineering) and step 3 (detection).
The PCA techniques based in Lakhina’s work [6, 12, 17–20]
are more complete, in the sense that they consider steps 1 to 4.
Still, the diagnosing method is limited in those methods and
improved in MSNM [47, 48]. Yet, in MSNM works the de-
parsing step was not considered.
4. Case Study I: VAST Challenge
4.1. Experimental Framework
The data set comes from the VAST 2012 2nd mini challenge
[49], a publicly available dataset used for the IEEE Scientific
Visualization Conference of the year 2012. The VAST-MC2
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Table 2: State-of-the-art anomaly detection methodologies compared to the MBDA 5 steps.
Methodology Years Ref. Parsing Fusion Detection Pre-diagnosis De-parsing
PCA-based I 2003 [10] X 7 X 7 7
SVM 2003–2015 [11, 43] (X) (X) X 7 7
PCA-based II 2004–2018 [12, 15, 16, 20] X X X (X) 7
Clustering 2009–2016 [30–35, 37, 38] X X X 7 7
HASHDOOP 2014 [28] X X X 7 7
Entropy Calculation I 2015 [44] (X) 7 X 7 7
Entropy Calculation II - TADOOP 2015 [40] X 7 X 7 7
Entropy Calculation III 2016 [41] X X X 7 7
MSNM 2016–2017 [22, 48] X X X X 7
MBDA 5-steps 2019 X X X X X
presents a corporate network scenario where security incidents
occur during two days. In particular, some of the staff report
unwanted messages and a non-legitimate anti-virus program
appearing on their monitors. Also, their systems seem to be
running more slowly than normal. In summary, a forensics op-
eration is required to discover the most relevant security events
and their root causes. As the challenge is from the past, we
know the solution beforehand: a botnet infected the network
and attacked the DNS servers, causing performance issues and
the infection of workstations with adware.
This case of study serves to illustrate Phase I (exploratory
mode) for anomaly detection in an environment with disparate
security data sources. Phase II is not feasible because the net-
work is already infected and data under NOC is not available.
The main objective of Phase I is network troubleshooting and
optimization, detecting anomalies that leads to problems and
misconfiguration.
The network infrastructure for the challenge consists of ap-
proximately 4,000 workstations and 1,000 servers that operate
24 hours a day. The intra-network nodes are in the IP range
of 172.x.x.x and IPs from other ranges are considered external.
The data provided with the VAST 2012 mini challenge 2 consist
of Cisco ASA firewall logs including a total of 23,711,341 data
records, and intrusion detection system logs including 35,948
data records. The dataset details are available at [49].
Reproducibility of results in this case study is
possible by downloading the virtual machine at
https://nesg.ugr.es/veritas/index.php/mbda
4.2. Application of the 5-steps methodology
Parsing & Fusion steps. First of all, using the FCParser
tool, the data from the two data sources is parsed and fused
into observations for analysis. Firewall and IDS logs are semi-
structured data sources because the format of the different data
entries is not fixed. Thus, this experiment illustrates how the
FCParser can be used to deal with different kinds of sources of
information with uneven formats.
From the raw data, 265 features have been designed, 122
for firewall logs and 143 for IDS logs. In Tables 3 and 4 an
overview of the features can be found. We decided to use 1
minute time interval for each observation, obtaining, as a re-
sult, a 2345 x 265 matrix of parsed data. This reduces the 4.2
GB of raw data to less than 2.5 MB, showing that this step is
effectively used as a compression step.
Table 3: Firewall features overview
Number of features Data considered in the features
6 Source and destination IPs
84 Source and destination ports
13 ASA Messages
2 Protocol
8 Syslog priority
7 Action
2 Direction of conection
Table 4: IDS features overview
Number of features Data considered in the features
6 Source and destination IPs
84 Source and destination ports
4 Snort priority
33 Snort Classification
10 Snort event description
6 IP headers
Detection step. The relevance of the different features in
terms of security is heterogeneous. For example, a connection
to the port 80 found in the firewall logs is not as important as a
SSH brute force attack detected in the IDS logs. For this reason,
to establish levels of severity, each feature is assigned a weight
from 1 to 10. This weight is multiplied to the data after auto-
scaling, so that the higher the weight, the higher the relevance
of the variable in the model.
Once the parsed data is prepared, the MSNM Phase I analy-
sis is performed. For that, the PCA model is obtained and the
D-st and Q-st are computed for each observation. Because the
data volume is reduced, we did not employ the Big Data func-
tionality in the MEDA Toolbox, which will be illustrated in the
other case study. With the monitoring statistics, the Tscore in
Eq. (6) is computed for observation triaging. Figure 2 shows
the Tscore values for the complete two day interval. The 5 ob-
servations that stand out the most are selected for further anal-
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Figure 2: Tscore values for each observation.
ysis: 369, 370, 1413, 389, 384.
Pre-diagnosis step. We use the US tool to extract informa-
tion about the selected anomalies following Eq. (7). This pro-
cedure yields a subgroup of features that are related to the given
anomalies providing insight into those events. The US scores
with the highest absolute magnitude highlight the main vari-
ables related to an anomaly. A positive score for a variable
means that the anomaly presents an unexpectedly high value
of that variable, while a negative score means right the oppo-
site: the value of the variable is lower than expected. Many
times, US scores are informative enough to avoid the need to
look at the original raw data, that is, to perform the deparsing
step. This makes diagnosis faster and, in turn, response to se-
curity incidents faster.
In Figure 3, the US plot of the observation number 369, cor-
responding to timestamp 2012-04-06 00:04, is shown. The fea-
tures with values that stand out from the others are selected.
Table 5 shows the features associated to each of the five obser-
vations identified in the detection. Those results demonstrate
that MBDA makes the most of the combination of the two data
sources, as the US yields feafures from both sources, for exam-
ple, for observations 369 and 370.
De-parsing step. Finally, from the timestamps of the events
and the features related to anomalies, the specific raw logs as-
sociated with the detected anomalies are extracted. This is
achieved using the FCParser tool. The last three columns in
Table 5 summarize the results of de-parsing the 5 anomalies
from the anomaly detection step. To sum up, a total of 450 log
entries are retrieved, representing a 0.0019% of the logs in the
original data. However, there are only 10 different log types,
representing only 0.00004% of all the input data, which makes
the analyst interpretation of the results straightforward. In the
following this interpretation is discussed.
At 06/04 00:04, numerous attempts of data exfiltration by
Telnet and SSH were discovered. The firewall blocked the Tel-
net connections, however, the SSH connections passed through.
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Figure 3: US plot for the observation 369.
At 06/04 00:05, an information leakage carried out using
SNMP was detected by the IDS. The deparser also shows that
those requests were blocked by the firewall.
At 06/04 00:19 and 06/04 00:24 we can see multiple vulner-
ability scans targeting remote desktop services like VNC and
RDP. In particular, the detection of just two logs related to RPD
shows that the MBDA approach is especially sensitive to events
which are not common in the traffic, being an adequate tool to
identify those events as soon as they show up.
At 06/04 17:28 the logs extracted from the deparser spotlight
a coordinated attack from multiple infected systems targeting
the DNS server at 172.23.0.10. If the DNS server is compro-
mised, that would be the reason for the ad-ware and malicious
anti-virus programs that appeared on the systems.
Summary. This example shows that with the proposed ap-
proach and one single iteration of the Phase I analysis, we can
extract most of the relevant information on the compromise
of the network in the present example. Just 10 log types are
enough to shed light on what has occurred on the most anoma-
lous events, drastically reducing the time from detection to re-
sponse and consequently, the cost derived from those events.
5. Case Study II: ISP Network
5.1. Experimental Framework
In this section, we present the 5-steps methodology applied
to a real network scenario, taking as input the UGR’16 dataset.
For the sake of completeness, we provide a brief description of
the dataset in what follows, although all the details can be found
in [50].
We collected this data on a real network of a Tier 3 ISP. The
services provided by the ISP are mainly virtualization and host-
ing. To a shorter extent, the ISP also provides common Internet
access services.
Netflow sensors were deployed in the border routers of the
network to collect traffic corresponding to its normal operation.
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Table 5: VAST2102: Anomaly Diagnosis.
Index Timestamps Tscore Sources Features selected logs log types Deparsing (Interpretation)
fw dport telnet ids ssh scan Data exfiltration attempt
369 06/04 00:04 19.94 ids & fw ids ssh scan outbound 32 3 by SSH and Telnet, the latter
ids dport ssh blocked by access lists.
fw dport snmp fw denyacl
ids dport snmp ids snmp req Attempted information
370 06/04 00:05 19.52 ids & fw ids successful-recon-limited 71 4 leak using the SNMP protocol.
fw error ids brute force
ids attempted-recon
384 06/04 00:19 7.36 ids ids scanbehav 2 1 Scan for windows RDP
ports for vulnerabilities.
ids attempted-recon Scan ports in range
389 06/04 00:24 17.25 ids ids successful-recon-limited 91 1 5900-5920 looking
ids prio2 ids vnc scan for vulnerabilities.
1413 06/04 17:28 19.38 ids ids policy-violation 254 1 DNS server attack from
ids prio1 ids dns update multiple systems.
Table 6: Characteristics of the calibration and the test sets.
Feature Calibration Test
Capture start 10:47h 03/18/2016 13:38h 07/27/2016
Capture end 18:27h 06/26/2016 09:27h 08/29/2016
Attacks start N/A 00:00h 07/28/2016
Attacks end N/A 12:00h 08/09/2016
Number of files 17 6
Size (compressed) 181GB 55GB
# Connections ≈ 13,000M ≈ 3,900M
In addition, a total of 25 virtual machines were deployed in or-
der to perform controlled malicious activities. Some of these
virtual machines were used to launch a number of specific at-
tacks over time against the rest, which acted as the victims of
the attacks. The ISP personnel was aware and collaborated in
the experiment.
We obtained two sets of data. A calibration set with more
than three months of traffic and a test set of appr. one month.
The main characteristics of both sets are shown in Table 6. At-
tacks were generated during the test set time period, in intervals
of 2 hours and alternating with legitimate traffic for 12 consec-
utive days. This example illustrates the application of the pro-
posal through Phases I & II (exploratory and learning mode).
5.2. Application of the 5-steps methodology
Parsing step. In the first step, data from the calibration and
test datasets are parsed into M-dimensional vectors (observa-
tions) representing time intervals of 1 minute. In particular, we
defined a set of M=138 network-related features, correspond-
ing to 11 different Netflow variables as shown in Table 7. The
1 minute interval leads to app. 144K observations in the cali-
bration data, with an storage volume of app. 80 MB. A sin-
gle machine with 16 cores running the FCParser parses 100M
connection logs in 3 hours and 16 seconds, and computations
can be fully parallelized. Thus, the complete computation of
Table 7: Overview of Features in the second case study.
Variable #features→ values
Source IP 2→ public, private
Destination IP 2→ public, private
Source port 50→ specific services, Other
Destination port 50→ specific services, Other
Protocol 5→ TCP, UDP, ICMP, IGMP, Other
Flags 6→ A, S, F, R, P, U
ToS 3→ 0, 192, Other
# Packets in 5→ very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Packets out 5→ very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Bytes in 5→ very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Bytes out 5→ very low, low, medium, high, very high
13,000M connection logs in our calibration data set can be done
in app. 16 days in a single, 16 core, machine, or in little more
than 6 hours in a large-size parallel cluster of 1000 cores. A
main limitation to speed-up the parsing is the use of python
as the programing language of the FCParser. Regular expres-
sions in python are much slower than in other programming
technologies. To check an alternative technology in order to re-
duce processing times, we also programmed an ad-hoc parser
in C, which was observed to be 100-times faster. The latter
defines the regular expressions corresponding to the features at
code level, unlike the FCParser, where the selection of features
is done at configuration level, i.e. in configuration files. The
definition of the features in configuration files is slower, but
simplifies the application of the 5-steps methodology in a new
problem and the re-definition/modification of features.
Thanks to the compression ability of the first step, the rest of
steps can be performed in a regular computer.
Fusion step. In this example we work on a single source of
data: Netflow. Therefore, no data fusion is necessary.
Phase I. Detection step. In this case study, we first detail
the Phase I analysis of the calibration set, and then we proceed
with the Phase II using the test data. In what follows, steps 3 to
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Table 8: Most relevant variables in the US pre-diagnosis for outliers
20160326t1229-20160326t1230 and 20160513t1003.
Time interval 20160326t1229-20160326t1230
‘npackets verylow’ ‘srctos zero’ ‘tcpflags ACK’
‘dstip public’ ‘srcip public’ ‘protocol udp’
‘nbytes medium’ ‘dport register’ ‘sport register’
Time interval 20160513t1003
‘dstip public’ ‘srcip public’ ‘tcpflags ACK’
‘protocol tcp’ ‘tcpflags SYN’ ‘npackets verylow’
‘nbytes verylow’ ‘srctos zero’ ‘dport reserved’
‘dport smtp’ ‘sport reserved’ ‘srctos other’
‘tcpflags RST’ ‘sport smtp’
5 are illustrated for both phases.
While the previous steps led to a large compression of the
information (from 181GB to 80 MB), the numbers in terms of
observations are still too large for the direct computation of the
PCA model. Thus, in this example, the Big Data module of the
MEDA Toolbox is employed.
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Figure 4: Compressed MSNM plot for the calibration set: scatter plot of the
Q-st vs the D-st. Outliers are labeled with their timestamps.
The compressed MSNM plot for Phase I analysis is shown in
Figure 4. The plot is a scatter plot of D-st values vs Q-st val-
ues, which is an alternative to the Tscore bar plot. Thanks to the
functionality in the Big Data module of the MEDA Toolbox, the
144K observations were clustered in 100 clusters to improve vi-
sualization. The size of the markers depends on the multiplicity
of each cluster, that is, the number of original observations in it.
This is particularly useful in anomaly detection, where outliers
typically show up as individual or very small clusters. Control
limits containing the 99% percentiles of the calibration sample
are shown in the plot to facilitate the identification of outliers.
Labels in the plot display the timestamp of several individual
observations. We can see that there is an excursion from nor-
mal traffic at day 2016-03-26 between 12:29 and 12:30, and
another at 10:03 of 2016-05-13.
Phase I. Pre-diagnosis step. In Table 8, we show the features
with highest magnitude according to the US for the two outliers
identified. For day 2016-03-26, the pre-diagnosis information
in the Table is too general, and we can search for more detail
with the MBDA 5th step.
Phase I. De-parsing step. Since the FCParser cannot handle
binary data in its current version, we will manually perform the
de-parsing step with nfdump commands. We run the following
command, extracted from the timestamps and the definition of
the features:
PROMPT$ nfdump -r <nfcapd.file> -t
2016/03/26.12:29:00-2016/03/26.12:30:59
‘(packets <4) and (bytes > 1000 and bytes <
10001) and (dst port > 1024 and dst port <
49151) and (src port > 1024 and src port <
49151) and (flags A or proto udp)’
where we intentionally combined ‘tcpflags ACK’ and ‘proto-
col udp’ with an ’or’ junction, since they are obviously contra-
dictory.
The query provided 436K flows out of the total ≈ 1.2M flows
in the two minute interval, which corresponds to 0.00003% of
the total size of the calibration data (a needle in a haystack).
From those, all but 80 flows were related to the anomaly
(99.98% of specificity). The flows reveal a scanning operation
from an internal machine (42.219.156.231) to all the 65535 pos-
sible UDP ports at machine with anonymized IP 62.151.13.8.
Further inspecting among the two IPs uncovered a total of 1M
flows.
For day 2016-05-13, the pre-diagnosis results show there
was an unexpected excess of very short SMTP connections. To
proceed with step 5, we run the following command:
PROMPT$ nfdump -r <nfcapd.file> -t
2016/05/13.12:29:00-2016/05/13.12:30:59 ‘packets
< 4 and bytes < 151 and dst port = 25 and (flags
S or flags A or flags R)’
where again flags are combined with ’ors’.
The query yielded a total of app. 125K flows out of the 400K
flows in that minute interval, from which all but 15 were re-
lated to the anomaly (99.99% of specificity). To interpret the
result, the flows only need to be aggregated by origin IP, leading
just to 4 public IPs following the pattern of a SPAM campaign.
The ISP IT team confirmed this was a client that hired virtual
machines during a period. The hired IPs finished in the YA-
HOO blacklists, and that is probably the reason why the client
stopped hiring the virtual machines. This misuse behavior was
repeated throughout the capture interval.
According to the MSNM philosophy discussed before, the
problems identified in the data need to be solved and further
data need to be collected to continue Phase I. Since we are
working on a previous capture, we cannot collect new data.
However, to continue the analysis an alternative is to filter out
the netflow traces isolating the attacks, and repeat Phase I from
the rest of data. After this second iteration, we stopped Phase I
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Figure 5: Tscores per test observation: higher values represent identified
anomalies.
Table 9: Variables in order of relevance according to the oMEDA diagnosis for
the selected anomaly in the test set.
Time interval 20160801t0410-0414
‘srctos other’ ‘sport register’ ‘nbytes low’
‘dport register’ ‘npackets verylow’
‘protocol udp’ ‘srcip public’ ‘dstip public’
‘tcpflags ACK’ ‘label background’
‘srctos zero’
to proceed with Phase II.
Phase II. Detection step. Once we finish Phase I, we have
a definitive normality model of the traffic and can proceed to
analyze incoming data in real time. This is exemplified using
the test data. The Tscore plot of the test data is shown in Fig.
5. While a compressed MSNM plot like the one shown be-
fore could be computed for this data, the toolbox only includes
its computation for calibration data, that is, data that is used
to generate the model. Still, the Tscore provides the identifi-
cation of the outliers. We can see there are outliers above the
regular spikes, the latter that correspond to synthetic attack pe-
riods. The most relevant anomaly corresponds to the interval
20160801t0410 to 20160801t0414, annotated in Figure 5.
Phase II. Pre-diagnosis step. The US pre-diagnosis of this
short interval shows an increase of ACK packets and very short
connections using UDP (see relevant features in Table 9), a pat-
tern that resembles that of the first anomaly in the calibration
data set, diagnosed as a scanning attack.
Phase II. De-parsing step. Proceeding with the 5th step,
we find a single IP from Germany creating 800K connections
(0.0002% of the total) from origin ports 5061, 5062, 5066 and
5069. The destinations are 4097 different hosts in 16 differ-
ent subnets with /24 mask. Each host is scanned through ports
6000-6060. The whole time interval contained more than 1M
flows, and the query accurately identified the connections of
interest plus a limited number of less that 1000 connections
(specificity of 99.87%). According to the IT staff, the event
seems to be a malware driven scanning, due to this specific pat-
tern of connection.
Summary. This example illustrates the application of the 5-
step methodology in a real data set, showing the viability of
both Phase I and Phase II analyses. In both situations, the
methodology could identify real attacks with a level of speci-
ficity higher than 99% and providing a reduced set of logs for
analysis. This experience also showed that the computation of
the 5-steps can be orders of magnitude faster using paralleliza-
tion hardware and/or a fast processing language. Permanent de-
ployments of this technique should take into account this find-
ing.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a Big Data anomaly detection
methodology named Multivariate Big Data Analysis (MBDA).
The approach is based on 5 steps and allows to detect anomalies
and isolate the related original information with high accuracy.
This information is very useful for the security team to reduce
the time from detection to effective response. We illustrated
our approach in a emulated benchmark with two semistructured
sources and in a real world network security problem.
Using MBDA, identifying the timestamp and the character-
istics of the anomalous traffic (e.g., the services affected) is a
matter of seconds. We illustrate several examples in which we
could identify the raw information corresponding to an attack
with a level of specificity higher than 99%, that is, more than
99% of the isolated logs were truly related to the attack. Fur-
thermore, extracted information corresponds in all cases to a
tiny portion of far less than 1% (a needle) of the complete data
set (the haystack).
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